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VANDA LAMM* 
 
Reciprocity and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice 
 
 
Abstract. The paper analyses the role and importance of the principle of reciprocity in the 
optional clause system of the International Court of Justice. After a short description of 
the Statute provisions on reciprocity of the two International Courts the author deals with 
the stipulation of reciprocity in declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court. The main part of the paper is devoted to the legal practice of the two International 
Courts on the matters of reciprocity. As a conclusion the author says that, by virtue of  
the principle of reciprocity, reservations to the acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction 
tend, in practice, to make their effect felt more often than not, precisely against the State 
or States making a reservation. 
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International law is permeated, perhaps more profoundly than any other 
branch of law, with reciprocity in the sense that rights must be coupled with 
certain obligations in relations between States and that there must be some sort 
of correspondence between rights enjoyed and obligations assumed,1 first of all 
because law is made by equal States, which, in creating law, are well aware 
of the need to assume certain obligations in exchange for their rights, and 
conversely. This thesis in international law holds true not only for law-making, 
but also for the application and enforcement of law. There is no doubt that the 
principle of reciprocity is most clearly manifested in the law of contracts, 
however, as will be seen in the following discussion, it is also a basic element 
of the system of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
 The International Court of Justice, being the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations under Article 92 of its Charter, has jurisdiction only with the 
consent of the parties. Dealing with the case of the Minority Schools of Upper 
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Silesia in the interwar period, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
formulated this thesis in the following terms: “The jurisdiction of the Court 
depends on the will of the parties.”2 This same thesis was expressed in the case 
of Eastern Karelia to the effect that no single State can be compelled to submit 
its disputes with other States to mediation or arbitration or any other procedure 
for peaceful settlement unless it has consented thereto.3 Later this principle was 
also reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in several cases. 
 Under Article 36 of the Statute, the parties may express their consent to 
the Court’s jurisdiction, in addition to other means,4 by a declaration of 
submission to or acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made by reliance on 
the so-called optional clause as referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 36. In 
relations between States that have made unilateral declarations of acceptance 
under the optional clause, a special system comes into effect whereby a State 
party to that system may refer to the International Court of Justice its dispute 
with another State party to that system by filing a unilateral application 
without the prior consent of the opponent State. 
 
 
1. Statute provisions on reciprocity 
 
Reciprocity is covered by Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute of the 
Court reading: “The States to the present Statute may at any time declare that 
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of 
the Court…” (para. 2) and “The declarations referred to above may be made 
unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
States, or for a certain time” (para. 3). At first sight, however clear these 
provisions appear to be, one can detect some confusion5 concerning the 
relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36. This is likely due to the 
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4
 Other means may include the agreement of the parties to submit an already 
existing dispute to the Court, or the so called compromissory clause of an international 
agreement providing that disputes arising between them of the kind envisaged in the 
compromissory clause, shall or may be submitted to the Court. 
 
5
 In a similar sense, see Thirlway, H. W: A.: The Reciprocity in the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1984, 98; Shabtai, R.: 
The Law and Practice of the International Court. A. W. Sijthoff—Leyden, 1963, 384; 
Shihata,  I. F. I.: The Power of the International Court to Determine its Own Juris-
diction. Martinus Nijhoff—The Hague, 1965. 147. 
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fact that while both paragraphs cover reciprocity, they refer to different aspects 
thereof. 
 Paragraph 2 of Article 36 is unambiguously clear about what is in reality a 
specificity of the entire regime of the optional clause, namely that it is a network 
of additional obligations and additional rights as between certain groups of 
States party to the Statute. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case Judge 
McNair described the optional clause as being contracting in rather than 
contracting out in nature.6 This regime operates only in the inter se relations of 
States that have made declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, 
and not in respect of all States party to the Statute. Professor Waldock, in his 
study on the optional clause, describes all this as the lack of “some basic 
mutuality” between States having made declarations of acceptance and those 
having made none. The declaring States are continuously liable to be brought 
before the Court at any time,7 however, States not making such declarations 
cannot be sued before the Court unless and until they choose to initiate 
proceedings before the Court as plaintiff and make declaration under the 
optional clause.8 
 As noted earlier, paragraph 3 of Article 36 refers to reciprocity in connection 
with the content of declarations of acceptance, in which reciprocity may be 
stipulated by States. It is this paragraph of the Statute that forms the legal basis 
of the practice of States to make restrictions or reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance, placing limitations as to persons, subject-matters or 
periods of time on the obligations they have assumed concerning the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
 The explanation for the Statute referring twice to the principle of reciprocity 
is offered by the documents preparatory to the drafting of the Statute, and 
the double reference can, in all likelihood, be attributed to the proposals of 
the Brazilian jurist Fernandez, a member of the 1920 Committee of Jurists. 
Fernandez thought that States were free to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on 
condition or unconditionally. He saw one such condition in reciprocity in 
respect of certain States or in respect of a certain number of States, including 
certain denominated States. The Brazilian expert argued that it is impossible 
for a State to accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction without knowing the 
States with which it is to undertake such an obligation. Regarding Fernandez, 
Thirlway comes to the conclusion that the Brazilian jurist’s draft sought to 
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allow States to choose those with which they are able to establish a compul-
sory jurisdiction relationship obligating them to submit their disputes to inter-
national adjudication.9 At any rate, it was under the influence of Fernandez’s 
proposals that the section saying that “the declarations referred to above may 
be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or 
certain Member States, or for a certain time” was inserted in the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. To our knowledge, the possibility for 
the “choice of partners” as originally suggested by Fernandez was used by 
only one State, namely Brazil, which in 1920 included in its declaration of 
acceptance a formula under which the declaration was to be effective “as soon 
as it has likewise been recognized as such by two at least of the Powers 
permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations”. Waldock’s 
statement that paragraph 3 of Article 36 refers in fact not to reciprocity is 
essentially in harmony with Fernandez’s concept. According to the prominent 
British jurist, what we have here is a provision authorizing States to accept 
compulsory jurisdiction for a definite period of time and on condition that the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction is also accepted by a certain number of States 
or by specified States. Thus, Waldock argues this is not a real “condition of 
reciprocity”, but one that a declaration will not become effective until the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction has been accepted by a certain number of 
States or by certain specified States.10 
 As is provided by paragraph 2 of Article 36., a State recognizes the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in respect of States “assuming the same obligation”. 
Here it is most likely that the framers of the optional clause had in mind cases 
in which a State accepts the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of only some of 
the four categories of disputes enumerated in paragraph 2.11 However, what 
happened in practice instead, was that States, by attaching reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance, did not exclude categories (a), (b), (c) or (d) of 
disputes, but, by naming precisely or less precisely formulated conditions as to 
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 Under para. 2 of Art. 36, States may recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of 
the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning 
 “a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
 b) any question of international law; 
 c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
 d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation”. 
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time, persons or subject-matters, they limited the scope of the obligations they 
undertook in respect of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.  
 Emmanuel Decaux writes that the original idea was confined to the 
reciprocity of acceptance, namely States making declarations of acceptance, 
and did not imply any sort of full reciprocity comprising reservations and 
conditions.12 According to the said author, paragraph 2 of Article 36 allows 
for two extreme concepts: minimum reciprocity is satisfied by both parties 
adhering to the system of the optional clause, whereas maximum reciprocity 
requires the parties to make identical declarations of acceptance. Where 
making reservations is not allowed, this distinction would be superfluous as 
States could make identical declarations only.13 
 Obviously, neither of these two concepts is acceptable. The minimum 
reciprocity disregards the wide diversity of declarations flowing from the many 
reservations attached to them, while the maximum reciprocity actually rules out 
the application of reciprocity as no two identical declarations of acceptance 
exist.14 Herbert Briggs stresses that any concept to the effect of “accepting the 
same obligation” presupposes that identical declarations or corresponding reser-
vations leads to the nullification of the system of compulsory jurisdiction 
under Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Statute, because States have wide 
discretionary powers to unilaterally determine the conditions for accepting the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.15 Taking the passage “accepting the same 
obligation” literally would imply that the system of compulsory jurisdiction 
would only operate in relations between States having made completely 
identical declarations, but would not operate with respect to the other States.16 
Thus, the passage “accepting the same obligation” does not mean that “exactly 
or even broadly the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction must have been 
accepted by each State,” but requires complete reciprocity in the operation 
of compulsory jurisdiction between two States which have accepted the 
obligation in different terms.17 
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 In a similar sense, see Briggs: op. cit. 242–243. 
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 Waldock: op. cit. 257–258. 
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2. Stipulation of reciprocity in declarations of acceptance 
 
A closer look at the declarations of acceptance made since the early 1920s 
reveals that stipulation of reciprocity, in most different formulations, can be 
found in most declarations of acceptance. There are declarations which refer to 
Article 36 of the Statute concerning reciprocity, using the phrases: “on condition 
of reciprocity”; “subject to reciprocity”; “subject exclusively to reciprocity”; or, 
“on the basis of absolute reciprocity”. Also known is the phrasing that the 
instrument creates an obligation in respect of “States making identical 
declarations” or of “States accepting the same obligation”, which is naturally 
equivalent to the aforesaid express stipulations of reciprocity. Declarations are 
frequent which contain the formula “in relation to any other State accepting the 
same obligation, that is to say on condition of reciprocity”; such a formula is 
termed by Briggs as the “double formula of reciprocity”.18 On the other hand, 
some declarations of acceptance contain no reference to reciprocity, meaning 
that the declaring States recognized the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction with-
out providing for reciprocity. 
 Regarding the inclusion of reciprocity in declarations of acceptance, the 
question automatically arises whether reciprocity applies to all declarations 
of acceptance and to the situation when a State makes no reference to, or 
expressly excludes, reciprocity in its declaration of acceptance.19 This question 
seems proper if only for the reason that, according to some authors, there is 
nothing to prohibit States from accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
without stipulating reciprocity. The view that distinction can be made between 
declarations of acceptance unconditionally and on condition of reciprocity 
is associated in the pertinent literature with Guiliano Enriques during the inter-
war years and with Hambro among other authors in later times.20 According 
to Enriques, declarations of acceptance made with the reference to reciprocity 
imply acceptance of obligations of only States having made identical 
declarations, whereas declarations made without refering to reciprocity apply, 
in the absence of a contrary provision, simply to obligations assumed in 
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 On the basis of paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Statute, Hambro deems it 
conceivable for a State to accept the Court’s jurisdiction unconditionally, which leads to 
the conclusion that such a State accepts the Court’s jurisdiction without the reciprocity 
clause. He adds, however, that this cannot be supposed to be the case. HAMBRO, E.: 
The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Recueil des Cours, 1950, I. 
184–185. 
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respect of States having ratified the Statute.21 It calls for no further explanation 
that, based on this view, the States having made declarations of the latter 
form would assume rather far-reaching obligations, for they would in fact 
accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in respect of all States party to 
the Statute. In connection with such declarations, Bertrand Maus writes 
that, in the absence of will expressed to that effect, such declarations can-
not be construed to imply an obligation wider that expressed in the clause 
itself.22 
 Concerning Enriques’s view, Thirlway points out that the author practically 
overlooks the reference to “reciprocity”, which is a kind of  communis error, 
contained in a declaration referring to paragraph 2 of Article 36, and that the 
possibility of excluding reciprocity is only given in respect  of paragraph 3, 
which, however, covers a different sort of reciprocity.23 
 The concept that reciprocity is neither a discretionary condition nor a 
reservation, but constitutes the basis of the system following from Article 36 of 
the Statute, can be considered to be the view of the majority in the pertinent 
literature.24 Reciprocity is a fundamental provision of the Statute applicable to 
all declarations of acceptance, including that of a State having unconditionally 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.25 This is supported by the 
practice of the two Courts, which purports the statement that “reciprocity” 
has always been interpreted as applying to all declarations of acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction. For that matter, practice over more than eight 
decades has shown that, as is asserted by Shabtai Rosenne, “(T)he real 
problem which has faced the Court has never been whether or why reciprocity 
exists and within the framework of the compulsory jurisdiction, but how it 
affects the Court’s jurisdiction in the concrete case.”26 
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 Maus, B.: Les réserves dans les déclarations d’acceptation de la jurisdiction 
obligatoire de la Cour International de Justice. Librairie E. Droz, Genève, Librairie 
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24
 Decaux: op. cit. 80. 
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 In a similar sense, see Waldock: op. cit. 255; Briggs: op. cit. 242; and Anand, R. 
P. Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Asia Publishing House, 
New York, 1961. 160. 
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3. Limits of reciprocity under the practice of the two Courts 
 
Practice of the Permanent Court of international Justice 
 
In the legal practice of the two International Courts, the question of reci-
procity has emerged in a number of cases, with both the parties, the Court and 
the pertinent literature not infrequently offering differing interpretations of 
this principle. The problem concerning the interpretation of reciprocity results 
from the fact that in 1920 the framers of the Statute did not consider how 
reciprocity would really operate with respect to reservations, so the will of the 
lawmakers provides no guidance in this matter.27 It is not accidental that 
Rosenne points to contradictions in the views of both the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the contemporary literature on the subject of 
reciprocity.28 
 In the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the 
case of the Phosphates in Morocco was the first occasion to consider the 
question of reciprocity. In the proceedings initiated by Italy against France, 
which was as a result of measures by Moroccan authorities described by the 
applicant as “the monopolization of Moroccan phosphates”, attention 
should be directed to, for the purpose of the present discussion, the French 
preliminary objection invoking the reservation to the French declaration of 
acceptance, which excluded the retroactive effect of the declaration. 
According to the reservation, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction existed in 
respect of any disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration, 
(i. e. after 25 April 1931—V. L.) with regard to situations and facts subsequent 
to this ratification.29 On the basis of reciprocity, France claimed that the 
exclusion of the retroactive effect in relations between the two States—
albeit the Italian declaration contained no reservation concerning earlier facts 
and situations—was effective as from the date of ratification of the Italian 
Court’s jurisdiction to exist in relations between the two States in respect of 
only disputes arising on the basis of facts and situations subsequent to 7 
September 1931.30 Decaux considers that the said objection of France not only 
involved reciprocity, but actually transplanted the French reservation into 
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 Thirlway: op. cit.112. 
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 Rosenne: op. cit.384. 
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 In that case the applicant State based the Court’s jurisdiction on the declarations 
of acceptance by the two States. 
 
30
 Phosphates of Morocco, in: Hudson, M.: World Court Report. Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Vol. IV. 315. 
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the Italian declaration,31 and that France invoked against Italy a pseudo-
reservation embodied in the Italian declaration.32 For its part, the Court stated 
that “(T)his (the Italian—V. L.) declaration does not contain the limitation that 
appears in the French declaration concerning the situations or facts with regard 
to which the dispute arose; nevertheless, as a consequence of the condition of 
reciprocity stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of this Court, 
it is recognized that this limitation holds good as between the Parties”.33 
However, the Court did not consider the question whether the restriction 
excluding the retroactive effect should operate in that particular case from the 
date of ratification of the Italian or the French declaration, as the Court held 
that “(T)he date preferred by one or other of the Governments would not in 
any way modify the conclusions which the Court has reached. It does not 
therefore feel called upon to express an opinion on that point.”34 In reality, 
therefore, the Court recognized the application of reciprocity to the 
reservations to the declarations of acceptance by the two States, but did not 
clarify the consequences ensuing there from. In that case, no special problem 
was caused by this course of the Court, since there was an interval of a few 
months between the dates of the deposit of the two declarations of acceptance. 
However, one can easily imagine a case in which the date accepted by the 
Court could have been of supreme importance. 
 Similarly, in the Electricity Company of Sofia Case between Belgium and 
Bulgaria, the Court was confronted with a reservation excluding the retroactive 
effect of the declarations. In that case, it was on the basis of reciprocity 
that Bulgaria—which recognized the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of 
States accepting the same obligation but “unconditionally”—invoked the 
reservation to the declaration of acceptance by the applicant State, Belgium; 
the declaration was ratified on the 10th of March, 1926, and the reservation 
was to the effect that the declaration applied to any disputes arising after 
the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts 
subsequent to this ratification. The Court stressed that “(A)lthough this 
limitation does not appear in the Bulgarian Government’s own declaration, it is 
common ground that, in consequence of the condition of reciprocity laid down 
in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute and repeated in the Belgian 
declaration, it is applicable as between the Parties”.35 
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 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria. In: Hudson: op. cit. Vol. IV. 408. 
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 Dealing with this decision, Alexandrov writes that the Court expressly 
and irrevocably recognized that reciprocity applies to reservations ratione 
temporis. Hence, it was necessary to determine two dates: the date of exclusion 
of the retroactive effect, on the one hand, and the critical date of emergence 
of the dispute, on the other.36 
 Despite their apparent similarity, the two cases considered by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice are different. In the Phosphates of Morocco case 
the respondent State actually contested the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of 
the reservation to its own declaration and not on the basis of reciprocity. It was 
a case of genuine reciprocity when that State wanted to have the date of 
exclusion of the retroactive effect counted from the deposit, not of its own 
declaration of acceptance, but that of the applicant State, yet that matter was 
not decided by the Court. On the other hand, in the case of the Electricity 
Company of Sofia, the reservation excluding the retroactive effect was 
contained in the declaration of acceptance of the applicant State, however, it 
was invoked by the respondent State on the basis of reciprocity, but such 
reciprocity was not recognized by the Court. 
 
Practice of the International Court of Justice 
 
The question of reciprocity has also been considered by the International Court 
of Justice in several cases.  
 Chronologically, mention should be made first of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company Case, which was submitted by the United Kingdom against Iran. In 
that case, the respondent State invoked the reservation contained in its own 
declaration of acceptance and excluded the retroactive effect of the decla-
ration.37 In its judgement on the preliminary objections the Court emphasized 
that “(B)y these Declarations jurisidiction is conferred on the Court only to the 
extent to which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it. As the Iranian 
Declaration is more limited in scope than the United Kingdom Declaration, 
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 Alexandrov, S. A.: Reservations in Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 
(Boston) London, 1995. 43. 
 
37
 By the terms of this reservation, the declaration did not apply to disputes arising 
after its ratification in respect of situations and facts relating directly or indirectly to the 
application of treaties or conventions accepted and ratified by Persia after the ratifi-
cation of that declaration. The dispute between the parties concerned the question of 
whether the reservation was operative in respect of the application only of treaties and 
conventions accepted by Iran after the ratification of the declaration or of treaties and 
conventions accepted by Iran at any time. 
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it is the Iranian Declaration on which the Court must base itself. This is the 
common ground between the Parties”.38 This statement regarding such 
“coincidence” has been repeatedly invoked by the Court, most recently in the 
case of Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria at the 
end of the 1990s.39 In connection with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 
Briggs notes that, since the respondent State was invoking the reservation to its 
own declaration as a bar to jurisdiction, there was no need for the reference 
to reciprocity, and it is likely that the Court and its President addressed that 
point “as an elucidation provided by the Court on a question argued at some 
length by the Parties in the pleadings.”40 
 Perhaps of greatest interest to reciprocity is the Norwegian Loans Case 
between France and Norway, which involved application, on the basis of 
reciprocity, of a subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. The declaration 
of acceptance made by France as the applicant State incorporated a reservation 
under which the declaration did not apply to disputes “relating to matters 
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the 
Government of the French Republic”. The Norwegian declaration of acceptance 
contained no such limitation, but, in its first preliminary objection, Norway 
contended that the International Court did not have jurisdiction in that case 
because by virtue of the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction the 
Court’s jurisdiction extended to legal disputes failing within one of the four 
categories enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, while the 
subject-matter of the dispute as stated in the French application related to the 
national law of Norway. In the second part of the objection, Norway relied on 
the principle of reciprocity in referring to the reservation to the French 
declaration of acceptance, under which “(T)his declaration does not apply to 
differences relating to matters, which are essentially within the national 
jurisdiction as understood by the Governments of the French Republic”.41 
 For its part, the International Court of Justice stated that “in the present 
case the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the Declarations made by the 
Parties in accordance with article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute on condition 
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 ICJ Reports, 1952. 103. 
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 ICJ Reports, 1998. 298. 
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 Briggs: op. cit. 253. 
 
41
 The second preliminary objection of Norway also referred to reciprocity ratione 
temporis, claiming that the Court was without jurisdiction because, under the French 
declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, the Court had jurisdiction in 
respect only of disputes relating to facts and situations subsequent to the ratification of 
the declaration. This question was not, however, considered by the Court. 
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of reciprocity; and that, since two unilateral declarations are involved, such 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which the 
Declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between the two 
Declarations shows that the French Declaration accepts the Court’s jurisdiction 
within narrower limits than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the 
common will of the Parties, which is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
exists within these narrower limits indicated by the French reservation”.42 
Referring to the statements of its predecessor in the Phosphates of Morocco 
Case and the Electricity Company of Sofia Case, as well as to its own findings 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, the International Court of Justice 
stressed that “(I)n accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in both Declarations 
and which is provided for in Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway, 
equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially within its national 
jurisdiction”.43 
 In the literature on international law, the Court’s judgement rendered in the 
Norwegian Loans Case prompted a large share of criticism, first of all 
because the Court had in fact sidestepped the question of how far subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction were admissible and valid in respect of 
national jurisdiction and, instead of deciding that question, it just stated the 
lack of its jurisdiction on the basis of reciprocity. In its judgement, the Court 
did not deal with the validity of the reservations, and the majority of the judges 
took the position that—since the validity of the reservation was not contested 
by the parties—the Court was faced with a restriction that was deemed by both 
disputants to express their common will regarding the competence of the 
Court, and the Court “ … gives effect to the reservation as it stands and as the 
parties recognize it”.44 
 In connection with reciprocity, Decaux writes that it would have been 
possible to consider two concepts of reciprocity in this case. The first is an 
objective one, under which France has no discretionary power by virtue of its 
reservation invoking national jurisdiction, but is bound by good faith. As the 
matters relating to loans do not pertain to the French internal law, they cannot 
be incorporated in the Norwegian internal law on the basis of reciprocity.45 By 
contrast, under the subjective concept, the position of France is less important: 
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 Decaux: op. cit. 97. 
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the law operating between the two parties is constituted not by the content of 
the French reservation, but by the Oslo Government’s interpretation thereof in 
terms as if the reservation had been made by Norway. However, the author 
claims that this was not expressed by Norway, but by the Court’s judgement 
in its stead.46 Rather than consider the positions of France and Norway on 
international bonds, the Court based itself on the assumption that the 
determination of matters falling within national jurisdiction was subjective 
and that the parties’ declarations were sufficient and fell outside the scope of 
consideration by the Court.47 
 Thirlway likewise holds that, with respect to the scope of reciprocity, the 
Court went rather far in the Norwegian Loans Case when it had not simply 
“written” into the Norwegian declaration the reservation expressed in the 
French declaration of acceptance, but had also adapted it to its new environment 
in the sense that it had turned the matters understood by the French Government 
to be within national jurisdiction into ones understood by the Norwegian 
Government to fall within national jurisdiction.48 
 In connection with the cited passage of the Court’s decision in the 
Norwegian Loans Case, Briggs raises the question why, in relation to the 
condition of reciprocity contained in the declarations, the Court referred to 
paragraph 3, and not to paragraph 2, of Article 36, although the issue 
sometimes emerged that reciprocity was not an absolute condition of Article 
36 of the Statute, because paragraph 3 thereof permits declarations of 
acceptance to be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity.49 For 
that matter, in its earlier judgements, the Court argued that Statutory condition 
of reciprocity contained in paragraph 2 of Article 36, as it also appeared from 
the Court’s opinion on the Norwegian loans. Therefore, Briggs is of the view 
that the reference to paragraph 3 instead of paragraph 2 is thus probably an 
error.
50
 On the other hand, Renata Szafarz’s conclusion is that the reference 
in this case to paragraph 3 instead of paragraph 2 is to a certain degree 
inconsistent with the Court’s earlier decisions, but may also justify the 
inclusion in declarations of the condition of reciprocity regardless of the fact 
that reciprocity is covered by Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.51 The 
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Polish international jurist stresses further that reservation in this case has 
undergone a significant transformation, as the principle of reciprocity 
enabled Norway to invoke the reservation, and invoke it not in its original 
form, notably in its applicability to France, but in a modified form to allow 
its content to be applied to Norway. She adds that the effects of reservations 
in the declarations of acceptance differ essentially in this respect from the 
reservations attached to international treaties and that the effects of the 
principle of reciprocity has much more far-reaching implications for reser-
vations contained in declarations of acceptance.52 
 Alexandrov takes a more understanding attitude towards the Court and 
writes that—since in the French view it is not sure that whether the class of 
disputes which could be determined by France belonging to its domestic 
jurisdiction would not necessarily coincide with those understood by another 
State to fall within domestic jurisdiction “(T)he only way to apply reciprocity 
was to allow Norway to exclude the same category of disputes as regards 
Norway.”53 
 Despite the criticisms the International Court has faced for its decision in 
the Norwegian Loans Case, one should acknowledge that the Court did not 
have much choice in terms of ways to pronounce itself, for if it had decided 
that subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction were either admissible or 
inconsistent with the Statute, its decision would have been bound to produce 
harmful effects on the system of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.54 To 
avoid such pernicious consequences, the Court came to a decision by widening 
the scope of the reciprocity principle to an undoubtedly significant measure, 
thus also creating a good opportunity to demonstrate the backlash effect of 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. 
 Shortly after the judgement rendered in the case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans the International Court had to decide again on the question of reciprocity 
in two cases. 
 The first, examined by the Court, was the Interhandel Case between 
Switzerland and the United States regarding the restitution by the United States 
of the assets of the Société internationale pour participants industrielles et 
commerciales S.A. (Interhandel). Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of 
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the Counter-Memorial, the United States filed four preliminary objections. Of 
interest to our subject is the second objection, in which the United States 
contested the Court’s jurisdiction by contending that the dispute had arisen 
before Switzerland’s declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
became binding, i.e. the 28th of July, 1948. Referring to what had been stated 
by the Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, namely that declarations 
should coincide in conferring jurisdiction; the Washington Administration 
argued that since the United States’ declaration of acceptance contained a 
clause limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to disputes “hereafter arising”, while 
the Swiss declaration contained no such clause, but the principle of reciprocity 
required that, between the United States Switzerland, the Court’s jurisdiction 
be limited to disputes arising after the 28th of July, 1948, the date the Swiss 
declaration came into force. The Court rejected that objection and pointed 
out the following: “Reciprocity in the case of declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court enables a Party to invoke a reservation to 
that acceptance which it has not expressed in its own declaration but which the 
other Party has expressed in its declaration… Reciprocity enables the State 
which has made the wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely 
upon the reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other Party. There the 
effect of reciprocity ends (my emphasis—V. L.). It cannot justify a State, in 
this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the other 
Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own declaration”.55 
 In the Interhandel Case, the United States sought a double application of 
reciprocity, as is pointed out by Briggs.56 Decaux wrote: double application of 
reciprocity, which, as against its single application securing the equality of the 
parties, is virtually conducive to inequality, and here with this case is a Swiss 
(non-existent) reservation excluding the retroactive effect and conferring 
advantage to the United States only.57 However, by rejecting the American 
stand, the Court created a clear situation, defining the limits of reciprocity and 
blocking the way to potential abuse of double reciprocity.58 
 From the point of view of restrictions laid down in declarations of 
acceptance, the Court, in dealing with the Interhandel Case, faced a similar 
situation to that in the Phosphates of Morocco Case. Unlike its predecessor, 
however, the Court examined the question thoroughly clearly determining the 
aforementioned limitations on the application of reciprocity. 
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 The question of reciprocity was considered by the International Court of 
Justice in the greatest detail in the Case concerning the Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory. These proceedings were initiated by Portugal against India 
on the ground that the Delhi Government denied passage through Indian 
territory between the Portuguese enclaves. A specific feature of this case is 
that Portugal filed an application against India a few days after the deposit 
of its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; the 
Portuguese declaration was dated the 19th of December, 1955, and the Lisbon 
Government submitted its application on the 22nd of December, 1955. In 
response, India filed six preliminary objections, several of which related to the 
question of reciprocity. 
 In the first preliminary objection, India took exception to the third 
condition contained in the Portuguese declaration, under which Portugal has 
the right, by making at any time a notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to the effect of withdrawing from the compulsory jurisdiction 
any matter. The Indian Government contended that the said clause of the 
Portuguese declaration enabled Lisbon to withdraw, by a simple notification 
made at any time, from the Court’s jurisdiction on any matter which has been 
submitted to it prior to such notification. India claimed that the said condition 
was incompatible with the principle and notion of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court as established in Article 36 of the Statute, it introduced an element 
of uncertainty regarding the obligations of the declaring State; and it was 
contrary to the principle of reciprocity. The Court held that the said condition 
caused no uncertainty and did not contradict the basic principle of reciprocity 
underlying the optional clause, since any such reservation, by virtue precisely 
of the principle of reciprocity, was to become automatically operative against 
it in relation to other signatories of the optional clause.59 The Court likened 
reservations concerning the right to modify declarations with immediate 
effect to clauses concerning the right of denunciation by simple notification 
with immediate effect, stating that there is no essential difference between the 
situations created by these clauses, with regard to the degree of certainty, and 
the third condition of the Portuguese declaration which leaves open the 
possibility of a partial denunciation.60 In connection with modification of 
declarations, the Court pointed out that “when a case is submitted to the Court, 
it is always possible to ascertain what are, at that moment, the reciprocal 
obligations of the Parties in accordance with their respective declarations”.61 
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 In its second preliminary objection, the Government of India invoked 
reciprocity, contending that the filing of the Portuguese application violated 
the principle of “equality, mutuality and reciprocity” generally recognized 
in connection with declarations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction. 
Portugal filed its application as little as three days after its declaration of 
acceptance, leaving insufficient time for the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, in compliance with Article 36 paragraph 4 of the Statute, to 
transmit copies of the Portuguese declaration, before the filing of the 
application, to the other parties to the Statute, including India among other 
States. The first argument of the Court was that “(T)he principle of reciprocity 
forms part of the system of the optional clause by virtue of the express terms 
both of Article 36 of the Statute and of most declarations of acceptance, 
including that of India. The Court has repeatedly affirmed and applied that 
principle in relation to its own jurisdiction. It did so, in particular, in the case 
of Certain Norwegian Loans (ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 22—24) where it recalled 
its previous practice on the subject. However, it is clear that the notions of 
reciprocity and equality are not abstract conceptions. They must be related to 
some provision of the Statute or of the declarations”.62 The second part of 
the Court’s answer was that, in addition to the deposit of declarations of 
acceptance with the Secretary-General, the Statute contained no further 
requirement, such as a certain interval between the deposit of the declaration 
and the filing of the application. At every moment the declaring State is to 
“expect that an Application may be filed against it before the Court by a 
new declaring State on the same day on which that State deposits with the 
Secretary-General its Declaration of Acceptance”.63 The Court concluded that 
the filing of the Portuguese application was in no way against Article 36 and 
did not violate any right of India under the Statute or the declaration of 
acceptance.64 
 The fourth Indian preliminary objection was closely related to the second. In 
it, the Government of India contended that, since it had had no knowledge of the 
Portuguese declaration before Portugal filed its application, it had been unable 
to avail itself, on the basis of reciprocity, of the third Portuguese condition 
and to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court the dispute which was the 
subject-matter of the Portuguese application. In connection with the objection 
the Court practically repeated its above finding and stressed that the manner of 
filing the Portuguese application did not, in respect of the third Portuguese 
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condition, violate the rights under Article 36 of the Statute concerning 
reciprocity in such a way as to constitute an abuse of the optional clause.65 
 On the basis of the documents presented to the Court and of what the 
representatives of India stated before the Court, the position of India on 
reciprocity can be summarized as this: the Statute covers general and continuous 
reciprocity between two Statutes, and applies to the relations between them from 
the beginning of the relations established under the optional clause up to the date 
of termination of the respective declarations.66 Contrary to this, the Court held 
that “it is not the date of deposit of a new Declaration which constitutes the 
crucial date for purposes of the jurisdictional requirement of reciprocity, but the 
date on which an Application is filed”.67 
 Dealing with the position of the Court, Decaux states that, in effect, it 
would have been possible to interpret reciprocity in a wider and a narrower 
sense. According to the wider interpretation, maintained by India, reciprocity 
generally applies to all obligations and rights deriving from declarations 
made under the optional clause. On the other hand, according to the narrower 
interpretation appearing in the Court’s decision, the determinant factor 
concerning the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties is the time the 
proceedings are instigated.68 
 During the 1980s, new problems emerged concerning the application of 
reciprocity in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions in and 
against Nicaragua. 
 In the case submitted by Nicaragua against the United States, one of the 
most important points of controversy between the parties arose out of the fact 
that three days before Nicaragua filed its application the United States, by a 
Note to the International Court, had modified its declaration of 1946 to exclude 
from the Court’s jurisdiction certain disputes relating to Central America.69 
The United States declaration of acceptance originally fixed six months’ notice 
for the termination of the declaration. Nicaragua’s declaration contained no 
such restriction. The United States claimed it had modified its declaration of 
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1946 by its 1984 notification, so the Court was without jurisdiction on the 
9th of April, 1984, the date at which Nicaragua filed its application. The 
Washington Administration invoked reciprocity in an effort to render its 1984 
notification immediately effective. That argument sought to ensure that since 
Nicaraguan declaration, being indefinite in duration, is subject to a right of 
immediate termination, without previous notice by Nicaragua, the United 
States declaration could also be terminated with immediate effect by virtue 
of the principle of reciprocity regardless of the six months’ notice proviso in 
the United States declaration. The Court refused to accept the American 
argument and emphasized that “(T)he maintenance in force of the United 
States Declaration for six months after notice of termination is a positive 
undertaking, flowing from the time-limit clause, but the Nicaraguan Declaration 
contains no express restriction at all. It is therefore clear that the United States 
is not in a position to invoke reciprocity as basis for its action in making the 
1984 notification which purported to modify the content of the 1946 
Declaration. On the contrary it is Nicaragua that can invoke the six month’s 
notice against the United States—not of course on the basis of reciprocity, 
but because it is an undertaking which is an integral part of the instrument 
that contains it.”70 The Court explained that “(T)he notion of reciprocity is 
concerned with the scope and substance of the commitments entered into, 
including reservations, and not with the formal conditions of their creation, 
duration or extinction. It appears clearly that reciprocity cannot be invoked in 
order to excuse departure from the terms of a State’s own declaration, 
whatever its scope, limitations or conditions.”71 In other words, the Court held 
that the six months’ notice formed an integral part of the American declaration 
of acceptance and constituted a condition which must be taken into account 
regardless of whether it related to the termination or the modification of the 
declaration. 
 The Nicaraguan case provoked, if for no other reason than its political 
relevance, a great deal of discussion in the pertinent literature. The Court’s 
findings about reciprocity and the limits thereof were consistent with the view, 
as expounded in the majority of writings published before the Nicaraguan case, 
that reciprocity cannot be applied to the formal conditions, duration, extinction 
declarations, etc.72 For the matter, a few members of the Court, including, 
e.g., Sir Robert Jenning, in his separate opinion given in the Nicaraguan 
case, relied precisely on reciprocity, among other things, for criticizing the 
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judgement, observing that the reservations by which one of the parties can 
withdraw or alter a declaration with immediate effect produces an inequality 
and lack of reciprocity between the parties.73 
 In relation to the Nicaraguan case, mention should be made of Spain’s 
declaration of acceptance of 1990, which extended the principle of reciprocity 
to the conditions for termination of the declaration. The Madrid Government, 
most certainly guided by an endeavour to avoid a situation similar to that in 
which the United States found itself, fixed six months’ notification of the 
withdrawal of its declaration, “however, in respect of those States which in 
their respective declarations have established a shorter period of time between 
the notification of the withdrawal of their declaration and its becoming 
effective, the withdrawal of the Spanish declaration shall become effective 
after such that shorter period.”74 Thus, Spain intended to apply reciprocity to 
the withdrawal of the declaration. Up to now, that condition as laid down in 
the Spanish declaration has not been applied in practice, but, at any rate, it 
would be of interest to know the position of the Court on that condition, as it is 
contrary to what the Court stated in the Nicaraguan case.75 
 
 
4. Consequences of reciprocity 
 
Application of reciprocity to the system of the optional clause and to 
declarations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction entails various 
consequences, of which one can highlight but a few now. 
 a) As noted earlier, the reference to reciprocity in paragraph 3 of Article 36 
was incorporated in the Statute based on the proposal of Fernandez. At the 
time, by the inclusion of reciprocity, Fernandez sought to ensure that States 
knew exactly which were the States, in respect of which, they had assumed 
obligations concerning the compulsory judicial settlement of disputes. Thus, 
by doing so, the Brazilian jurist wanted to eliminate certain elements of 
uncertainty. At that time, however, no one thought that there was another 
implication of reciprocity which, as is pointed out by Rosenne, operates to 
have the extent of jurisdiction crystallized and determined in a concrete case.76 
All this means that so long as a concrete legal dispute is not submitted to 
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the Court, there are specific elements of uncertainty actually accompanying 
the obligations of States under the optional clause and that it is only in 
principle that the Court’s jurisdiction exists in respect of disputes covered by 
declarations of acceptance. No State is in a position to know in advance which 
dispute will in practice be actually subject to the Court’s jurisdiction and no 
State can be absolutely certain that the Court’s jurisdiction will really extend to 
a particular dispute covered by its declaration of acceptance, for, in the last 
analysis, the Court’s jurisdiction always depends on the specific dispute or on 
whether a particular dispute is within the scope of the declaration of the given 
party and that of the opponent State. It could occur that a State has recognized 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a rather wide range of 
international disputes, but this notwithstanding the Court may in practice deal 
with a much narrower range of international conflicts of the State concerned 
by reason of the fact that the other disputant State has, or States have, accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a much more limited 
scope of disputes. 
 This was expressed by the Court in the Nicaraguan case by saying: “(T)he 
coincidence or interrelation of those obligations thus remain in a state of flux 
until the moment of the filing of an application instituting proceedings, The 
Court has than to ascertain whether, at that moment, the two States accepted 
“the same obligations” in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings”.77 
If the system of obligations established by the optional clause is broken down 
to the bilateral level, one can practically find no two identical scopes of 
reciprocal obligations, and the extent of obligations assumed by each declaring 
State in respect of the other States party to the optional clause system is 
essentially different. 
 b) Most authors in the pertinent literature agree that the inclusion of 
reciprocity in the Statute is intended to ensure equality of the parties—the 
elementary requirement of justice—before the Court.78 In Waldock’s view, 
the optional clause ensures exactly the same rights and obligations for all States 
(i. e. those which have made declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction—
V. L.). He further argues that equality, mutuality and reciprocity are principles 
underlying the system of the optional clause. In order to ensure the equality 
of the parties to the fullest extent, reciprocity has also been applied to the 
limitations and reservations attached to declarations of acceptance. This has 
gone the length of entitling the States, which have recognized the Court’s 
jurisdiction unconditionally, to avail themselves of the benefits of reservations 
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to declarations of acceptance by the adverse party. “The result is that 
application of the condition of reciprocity tends to equalize Declarations made 
with or without reservations.”79 In other words, a State making its declaration 
of acceptance without reservations or with some specific reservations 
recognizes the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in all other matters not affected 
by the reservations. This means that it has made an offer to the other States 
party to the optional clause system to the effect that it can be sued before the 
Court in any other matter. If a dispute is brought before the Court, and the 
declaration of acceptance of the applicant State contains reservations, the 
possibility exists for the respondent State to avail itself of the benefits of 
reciprocity and to invoke, if it so wishes, the reservations contained in the 
applicant State’s declaration of acceptance. It is precisely the principle of 
equality of the parties that sets a limit of reliance upon the reservation contained 
in the declaration of the adverse party on the basis of reciprocity, and, as is also 
exemplified by the Interhandel Case, the application of double reciprocity was 
rejected by the Court through reliance on the principle of equality. 
 c) Considering that a State may, by virtue of reciprocity, invoke the 
reservation to the declaration of the adverse party, reservations tend, in practice, 
to make their effect felt more often than not, precisely against the State or States 
making a reservation, which is to say that this is a two-edged weapon.80 Such 
was the case whenever the Court established the lack of its jurisdiction by 
invoking precisely the reservation or limitations contained in the declaration of 
the applicant State, while the respondent State relied on the reciprocity 
principle for causing the application of the other State to be rejected by the 
Court.81 
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